An Economic Analysis of Swaziland’s Cotton Pricing and Marketing Policies for Smallholder Farmers in Marginal Rainfall Areas by Shongwe, Phumulela S. et al.
DEPARTMENT OF 
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS 
AND EXTENSION
W O R K IN G  P A PE R
An Economic Analysis Of Swaziland’s Cotton Pricing 
And Marketing Policies For Smallholder Farmers 
In Marginal Rainfall Areas
BY
Pliuntelela S. Shongwe,
Kay Muir 
And
Reneth Mano
W O R K IN G  P A P E R  A E E  5/2000
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS AND EXTENSION, FACULTY OF 
AGRICULTURE, UNIVERSITY OFZIMBABWE, P 0 BOX MP167, MOUNT PLEASANT
HARARE, ZIMBABWE
&
1
An Economic Analysis Of Swaziland’s Cotton Pricing 
And Marketing Policies For Smallholder Farmers 
In Marginal Rainfall Areas
B Y
Phumelela S. Shongwe, 
Kay Muir 
And
Reneth Mono 
WORKING PAPER AEE 5/2000
Department o f  Agricultural Economics and Extension
Faculty o f  Agriculture
University o f  Zimbabwe
P O B o x  MP167
Mount Pleasant
Harare
ZIMBABWE March 2000
Phumelela S. Shongwe,
Kay Muir is Professor o f  Agricultural Economics and Extension, Department o f  Agricultural 
Economics and Extension, Faculty o f  Agriculture at the University o f  Zimbabwe
Reneth Mano is a Lecturer in the Department o f  Agricultural Economics and Extension, Faculty 
o f Agriculture, University o f  Zimbabwe.
The views expressed in this paper are those o f  the authors and do not necessarily express those o f  
the Department, University or any other institutions.
Working Papers are published with minimum formal review by the Department o f  Agricultural 
Economics and Extensions, University o f  Zimbabwe.
Abstract.
Cotton is the main source o f income for rural households in the smallholder-farming sector and provides 
employment at rural and national level. Despite the vital role played by cotton, production has declined 
since 1991. The main objective o f the study was to identify the country's competitiveness and comparative 
advantage in cotton production. In addition the study highlights the factors affecting cotton profitability.
The world market was used to assess Swaziland's comparative advantage in producing cotton because o f 
the on-going reforms in the SADC market. Smallholder farmers in kaKhuphuka have a DRC o f 1.2 
indicating that they would not be efficient competing on the world market. However, access to the Republic 
o f South Africa results in higher prices and a DRC o f 0.98, indicating efficiency in cotton production. 
There was a marked difference in the productivity o f low and high performing smallholders, high 
performers achieved DRCs o f 0.98 at world market prices and 0.87 at RSA prices.
Factors such as fertiliser application rate, area under cotton production, level o f education, farming 
experience and pesticide use were important than credit in affecting yield, although credit was also 
significant at p=0.05. Low performing credit farmers are making negative profits and apparent irrational 
producing cotton. The study revealed that, i f  low performing farmers increase yields by 13% in order that 
they will be profitable at the rural daily labour wage rate. Alternatively low-performers are considered 
rational to continue producing cotton i f  one assumes that the opportunity cost o f labour is 44% lower at E 
4.50 per man day. Improvement o f technology through research and extension is critical in increasing 
farmers'yields and subsequently both profits and Swaziland's competitiveness in cotton production.
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1.0 Introduction
1.1 Background and justification.
Agricultural policies tend to influence the performance of the overall agricultural sector and commodity 
policies change the environment within which production takes place. Getting agricultural policies right is 
a prerequisite for stimulating smallholder agricultural development. Commodity policies influence input 
and output prices, efficiency, growth, development and operation of marketing institutions. Inappropriate 
agricultural policies that reduce or nullify the benefits of other development initiatives are of great concern 
to governments, donors and international agencies (F.A.O, 1987). Due to the on-going reforms in the 
Southern African market, SADC countries have to embark on those activities where there is efficient use 
of resources so that they can realise growth and development.
Poor economic growth and development that has affected many SADC countries in the 1970s and 1980s 
are derived not only from natural catastrophes, but also from agricultural pricing and marketing policies 
that shape the opportunities faced by farmers. Takavarasha (1991), highlighted that agricultural prices are 
seldom left to the market mechanism regardless of the political system or level of development, it is an 
area o f policy decision making. The failure o f such policies to provide incentive prices has always been 
penalised by static or declining production growth. Attractive producer prices alone are, however, not the 
panacea for solving production problems. Production response function also consists of infrastructure, 
adequate availability o f inputs, technology change, credit, price o f other commodities and extension 
services.
Dlamini (1997) mentioned that the interventions in agricultural pricing in Swaziland used to be producer 
oriented but are now usually consumer oriented. In the case of producers, prices are increased in order to 
increase farm incomes. In the case o f consumers, the government’s intervention is to keep food prices 
down. Ofien such a practice tends to tax the agricultural sector, which results in resources being 
transferred from agriculture to other sectors.
Cotton is the main source o f income for rural households in the arid smallholder-farming sector and 
provides employment at rural and national level in Swaziland. Cotton plays a vital base for employment, 
rural and industrial development in many developing countries that grow and process it Morris et al 
(1988).
It is hoped that the outcomes o f this paper will capture the imagination o f policy makers, investors and 
other stakeholders in the country to design policies and strategies that are compatible with effective and 
efficient resource use in cotton production. This might create a policy environment that will ensure or 
facilitate sound resource investment in the cotton sub-sector, thus correcting its poor performance.
1.2 Problem statement and objectives.
Despite the vital role played by cotton in Swaziland, production has declined since 1991. The decline in 
cotton production has been accompanied by a reduction in the number o f cotton growers. Poor producer 
prices have often been cited as the main factor depressing production (MOAC, 1996).
The premise is that smallholder farmers in Swaziland could increase agricultural productivity if policies 
and institutions affecting them become more responsive to their needs. This paper examines the country's 
comparative advantage in cotton production. There are two central questions concerning the cotton policy 
in the country: firstly, is it an efficient use o f resources for Swaziland to produce cotton now and in the 
foreseeable future? The second is that if it is efficient, what combination o f policy incentives and 
institutional change are needed to promote domestic cotton production.
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1.3 Objectives of the study:
The main objective o f this paper is to identify the country’s competitiveness and comparative advantage in 
cotton production. In addition it highlights the factors affecting cotton profitability. In trying to achieve 
this objective, the impact o f cotton pricing and marketing policies were analysed as they relate to 
smallholder growers in the marginal rainfall areas. Input and output markets were assessed to find out 
whether there are divergences and if they are, do they provide incentives or disincentives to smallholders.
1.3.1 Specific objectives of the study:
(i) To describe the operation of the cotton industry with particular attention to pricing and 
marketing policies.
(ii) To determine the profitability of cotton for smallholders in dry areas and to measure its 
competitiveness.
(iii) To determine the effect of current policies on cotton production incentives.
1. Description and analysis of the study area.
A formal survey using a structured questionnaire was conducted at kaKhuphuka to collect primary data. 
Primary data was collected in mid-March and April, 1999. The data was used to develop farm budgets for 
the smallholder cotton growers. Probabilistic random sampling was used to select a sample of 150 
households from six villages within the study area. The households were selected from lists o f cotton 
growers obtained from Vunisa and the resident extension agent to obtain a sample representative of the 
types of farmers on the basis of credit use and output in cotton production.
Secondary data were collected by reviewing literature on cotton production practices, annual production, 
input costs and output price. Data on large-scale growers and the market were obtained from the 
Swaziland Cotton Board annual reports and accounts. Information on other aspects of cotton marketing 
was obtained from interviews with key informant within the industry (Natex and Spintex). This included 
information on cotton prices, total imports, tax collected, input and transportation costs.
2.1 Households description and farming systems.
Not all sampled households in this area had the same access to the necessary elements for effective 
farming (land, labour and capital assets). The households differed from each other mainly in terms of land 
size, source of draft power, capital assets and also type of labour (family, permanent employed or 
seasonally labour). Those growers who owned tractors, cattle and larger pieces of land were considered to 
be rich. Moreover, these rich cotton growers had permanent employed labour but the number of labour 
varied per household. More than 90% of the farmers were not only cotton growers. Maize and cotton were 
the major crops grown by farmers at kaKhuphuka. In most cases the land was shared between these two 
major crops. However, farmers reported that maize is often destroyed by drought, which frequently occurs 
in this area. Legumes such as groundnuts, beans and cowpeas were mainly grown as minor crops for 
relish making. Inter-cropping was not a common practice except for pumpkins and maize grown in the 
same fields.
2.2. Grouping o f cotton growers into credit and non-credit.
Some of the cotton growers were utilising a credit facility that is offered by Vunisa and others were not. 
This situation led into splitting of farmers into two main categories, credit and non-credit cotton growers. 
Moreover, this grouping of growers into categories was useful when analysing the effect of the credit 
subsidy in the Policy Analysis Matrix section. Using an average would hide the actual variation in 
production, which exist among farmers found in each category. Sixty- percent (90) were credit cotton 
growers and the forty- percent (60) were non-credit cotton growers. More than half (53.7%) of the non­
credit cotton growers reported that they were not utilising the credit facility because of past experience. 
They said that, experience had shown them that clearing a debt with Vunisa was not easy because each 
time they made a delivery at the market they were told that they owe. Variations in cotton production 
activities between and within credit and non-credit growers were observed. Within each category of
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growers there were differences in terms of input use, source of draft power, source of labour and yield, 
which led to the sub-division of growers into low and high performers. All those farmers who had three 
bales and below per hectare were classified as low performers, those who realised more than six bales 
were high performers. Those with 4 and 5 bales were not included in either category (39.3%).
2.3 Education and Farming experience
Nearly half (51.5%) of the cotton growers in the study had completed primary school. Only a few growers 
(8.1%) had not attained any level of formal education at all and none o f the smallholder cotton growers 
had a tertiary level of education (college or university). Nearly two-thirds (63.2) of the respondents had 
more than 20 years of farming experience including the growing of cotton. Very few (0.06%) farmers 
belonged to the group of 1 -  5 years of farming experience.
2.4 Pesticides use.
About two-fifth (43.3)% of all the cotton growers were using Ripcord and Oncall for pest control. There 
wasn’t much difference between credit and non-credit farmers in terms of quantities used. However, the 
use of rogor and ripcord was more prevalent in non-credit farmers, as such the average quantity used was 4 
litres per hectare compared to 2.6 litres used by credit growers. Although these two pesticides could be 
regarded as “old chemicals”, the farmers still have confidence in them.
None of the cotton growers did not use pesticides, the only variation was on the quantities used. A few 
credit farmers (18.7%) reported that they applied the pesticides as per extension recommendations. While 
the majority of credit and non-credit were practising prophylactic spraying. That is, they were spraying 
almost after every three to five weeks even if they do not see pests on their crop. Scouting of pests to 
determine whether to spray or not, was not really practised by the smallholder cotton growers in this area.
2.5 Source o f draft power
Most of the rich farmers (86%) were using their own tractors and oxen as means o f draft power. More 
than three-fifth (64.5%) of the respondents used government hired tractors for draft power mainly for land 
preparation. Most o f them were from the credit category. Oxen were used for planting and sometimes 
inter-row cultivation when the cotton plants are young and short.
2.6 Gross cotton sales
The majority o f the respondents (21.1%) had gross sales of E 2 940 to E 3 148.75 per hectare in 1997/98 
marketing season. Nearly 8% had gross cotton sales o f more than E 8 000 and 13.6% had sales o f less than 
E 2 940 per hectare. Rich cotton growers who had their own source o f draft power and had access to credit 
had higher gross cotton sales (E 9 362.30) in comparison with rich non-credit growers.
2.7 Sources o f  labour.
Cotton production is a labour intensive activity, from planting through to picking. For labour requirements 
most (49%) o f the growers were depending on both family members and hired labour. About two-fifth 
(36.7%) o f the cotton growers were relaying on family labour only for cotton production activities. Almost 
a sixth (14.3%) o f all the cotton growers depended mostly on hired labour. Credit farmers had twice the 
number of hired labour than non-credit farmers.
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Table 2.1. Summary of respondents’ profile in the study ( n = 150)
Characteristics of 
respondents
Percentage of
respondents (credit and non-credit)
Respondents’ most common 
character
Education 51.5 Completed primary school.
Farming experience 63.2 had more than 20 years 
Experience.
Pesticide use 43.3 Used Ripcord and Oncall for 
pest control.
Draft power 64.5 Hired government tractors.
Gross cotton sales 21.1 E 2 940 to E 3 148.75 per
in 1997/98 season hectare.
Source: Survey data.
2.9 Cotton yields.
Variation in grower’s yields was observed in each category of fanners. Among the 60 non-credit cotton 
growers 36.7% produced 2 and 3.6 bales (400 -  720kg) of seed cotton per hectare, while a few (18%) had 
yields as high as 7 to 11 bales (1560 to 2200 kg). The majority of non-credit growers obtained yields 
between 800 and 1 450 kg per hectare (Table 2.2). As for credit farmers, about 28% were getting low 
yields of less than 4 bales (800kg) and while a few (15.3%) had yields as high as 12 bales (2 400kg) per 
hectare. Even in this category of farmers, a majority obtained yields between 800 and I 450 kg/ha.
Table 2.2. Average yields (kg/ha) realised by smallholder cotton growers
in 1997/98.
Average yield (kg/ha) credit growers(%) non-credit growers (%)
400-720 28 36.7
800-1000 30.4 22
1 100-1 450 26.3 23.3
1 500 and above 15.3 18
Total 100 100
Source: Survey data.
3. Conceptual framework and analytical methods.
In principle, comparison o f enterprises with respect to their returns to land and labour can be derived by 
the analysis o f gross margins. The problem is that such analysis is done at the financial level at which 
prices are distorted by many interventions such as taxation, subsidies, price setting and over-valued 
exchange rates. Such distortions preclude judgements about profitability o f commodities at the national 
level. To determine the comparative advantage, evaluation of prices is done at the national level using 
social prices rather than market prices.
To provide answers to the questions on the country's comparative advantage, efficiency in cotton 
production and the factors affecting cotton profitability, Gross Margins Analysis and a Policy Analysis 
Matrix were used. These analyses were complimented by a Productivity Yield Gap Analysis, where a 
simple yield production linear regression model was used to determine that had significantly affected 
farmers’ cotton yields. Figure 2.1 shows the pathway o f analysis that was followed in this study. The 
starting point was that, smallholder farmers with and without credit were involved in the production on 
cotton as an enterprise. An a priori expectation was that, at household level the enterprise could either be 
profitable or not for both categories o f farmers. Gross Margin Analysis was conducted to find out if cotton 
production by each category o f farmers was profitable.
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Figure 3.1. An illustration of the conceptual framework used for analysis.
Methods o f
PRODUCTIVITY 
GAP ANALYSIS
Factors influencing 
farmers' yields.
It is possible to observe high or low gross margins (gross profitability) in the performance of an enterprise 
that might be due to distortionary policies put in place by a government. For example, if cotton production 
in Swaziland is highly subsidised, its possible that the gross margins will be high indicating that cotton 
production is privately a worthwhile enterprise to invest in. Thus, relying on gross margin analysis alone 
might not give a true picture about the efficiency of cotton production in the country. The inverse being 
true, if the output market is heavily taxed low gross margins would be realised which might make farmers 
believe that cotton production is not profitable.
Vunisa being a state certified monopoly, it is possible that the cotton prices offered to farmers are low 
because the company is a legislated monopoly that tends to distort the market prices. It is here that a PAM 
is appropriate. The analytical tools were used as a chain feeding into the other.
3.1 Gross margin analysis.
In this paper, the gross margin was used to analyse the gross profitability of cotton production at farm 
level and it provided some indications to the country’s continuous decline in productivity. However, it is 
important to note that, the gross margin is not necessarily a profit indicator although it assumes a linear 
model. Increasing the scale of operation could increase the gross margin proportionally and that will not 
mean that the activity undertaken is profitable. Therefore, it is vital that the total gross margin should be 
higher than the total overhead costs to be economically viable. For smallholder growers to continue 
producing cotton, it is important that their annual gross margins should increase over time (yearly) as the 
cost of production will be increasing too. The average income per hectare which farmers obtained from the 
cotton sales at Vunisa were considered as the gross income and the variable costs included the cost of
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fertilisers, seed, chemicals, transport, labour and interest on credit.
3.2 Policy Analysis Matrix.
The PAM has been developed and used by Monke and Pearson (1989). Others who have used the Pam 
include Rausser and Zusman (1992), Katyamba et al (1994), Mbiha and Kashuliza (1994), Takavarasha 
(1996), Dlamini (1997) and Sifundza (1997). The PAM in this paper was used to measure the effects of 
cotton price intervention on producer's incentives and to analyse the impact of direct policy measures as 
well as effect of some of the indirect policies. The PAM is based on the concept of economic profit and 
the various components contributing to it. It may said to be a system of double entry bookkeeping, thus 
analysts using PAM have to provide complete and consistent coverage to all policy influences on returns 
and costs of agricultural production (Mbiha and Kashuliza, 1994).
3.3 Yield productivity gap analysis.
This analysis was conducted after realising that low performers were not making profits because of low 
yields. Therefore, some of the socio-economic and agronomic factors were regressed using a simple linear 
regression model as shown in the equation 3.1.
Yd =/[X i,X 2...Xn]................................................................................................................. 3.1
Where : yd is the yield differential
X|...x„ independent variables affecting yield.
A regression analysis equation is used to estimate the unknown value of one variable on the basis of the 
known value of the other variable. According to Mansfield (1994), regression analysis provides estimates 
of dependent variable for given values of the independent variable or it provides an estimate of the effect 
on the mean value of dependent variable (y) of a one-unit change in the independent variable (x). Some of 
the reasons for choosing a linear model have been listed by# Mansfield as, the mechanics o f least squares 
are fairly simple to understand and its parameter estimates have optimal properties o f unbiasedness, 
efficiency and have the least mean-square-error.
4. Gross Margin Analysis.
Results from this analysis are based on the gross profitability of the cotton enterprise to smallholder 
farmers at household level.
4.1 Non-credit farmers.
(a) Average performance o f  non-credit farmers.
The average performance o f non-credit cotton growers indicates a gross profit of about E 136.55 per 
hectare (Table 4.1). Based on these results one could be tempted to say that cotton production is a 
profitable enterprise for smallholder cotton growers in the marginal rainfall areas of Swaziland. The basis 
of these results may not give a true reflection because averages or means are mainly influenced by extreme 
values in a range.
(b) Low performer non-credit farmers.
By growing cotton, this group of growers tends to lose more than E 380.00 per hectare when their own 
labour is costed (Table 4.1). Their profitability is mainly affected by low yields, labour and pesticide 
costs. Although the costs of labour and pesticides are lower than that of high performers, they take a larger 
proportion of the grower’s income.
(c) High performers non-credit farmers.
This group of farmers tend to realise a gross profit of more than E 800.00 per hectare. Although the cost of 
pesticides and labour is high that is being surpassed by the amount of income (E 4001,60/ha) this group of 
growers obtained from their sales (Table 4.1).
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Table 4.1: Gross Margin Analysis for non-credit farmers (E^a).
Average performance Low performers High performers
Yield (kg/ha) 1240.00 750.00 1640.00
Price (E/kg) 2.44 2.44 2.44
Gross income 3025 60 1830.00 4001.60
Less variable costs:
Seed 90 30 72.24 102 68
Fertiliser 205 73 143.08 299 78
Pesticides 924.27 618.25 969.14
Labour 1411.20 1264.80 1568 00
Draft power 111.05 87.49 181.71
Transport:
Inputs 11.10 11.10 11.10
Produce 85.80 85.80 85 80
SCB levy 49.60 30.00 65.60
G ross M argin 136.55 -385.86 814.69
Source: survey data.
4.2 Credit farmers.
(a) Average performance o f credit farmers.
Table 4.2 shows that, on average cotton growers who had access to credit made a gross profit of more than 
E 260 per hectare. Also drawing conclusions on the basis of these results only could lead to an incorrect 
information. It is therefore important to analyse each category before making any conclusions.
(b) Low performers credit farmers.
By producing cotton, this group of farmers tends to lose about E 197.32 per hectare when family labour is 
included at opportunity cost. Therefore cotton production by low credit performers is not profitable.
(c) High performers credit farmers.
A majority of farmers in this category are characterised by owning draft power (tractors and oxen). About 
23% (21) of the credit farmers were belonging to this category. According to the analysis the production 
of cotton is a worthwhile enterprise to these farmers, since they make profits o f E 686.22 as shown in 
Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2: Gross Margin Analysis for credit farmers (E/ha).
Average performance Low performers High performers
Yield (kg/ha) 1454.00 920.00 1780.00
Price (E/kg) 2.43 243 2.43
Gross income 3533.22 2235.60 4325.40
Less variable costs:
Seed 110.27 85.14 108.36
Fertiliser 269.60 182 07 282.23
Pesticides 860.05 664.40 1130.60
Labour 1560 00 1209.60 1664.00
Draft pdwer 120.00 105 00 135.00
Transport:
Inputs 11.10 11.10 11.10
Produce 85.80 85.80 8580
SCB levy 58.60 36.80 71.20
Interest on capital 194.08 149.91 247.79
Gross Margin 263.74 -197.32 686.22
Source: Survey data
4.3 Discussion of gross margin analysis results.
Cotton production was a profitable enterprise for credit and non-credit farmers in the marginal rainfall 
areas. Credit cotton growers obtained E 263.74 as profit per hectare and non-credit growers E 136.55. 
There was a slight difference o f about 100 kg between the mean yields of credit and non-credit cotton 
growers that did not lead to a large difference in terms of mean profit. The profit of credit cotton grower’s 
was about E 130.00 higher than that of non-credit growers.
Despite pesticide subsidy by the Swaziland Cotton Board, pesticide costs were also high for these cotton 
growers. Such that, credit and non-credit farmers used about E 860.00 and E 924.00 per hectare on 
pesticides respectively. The survey revealed that ripcord and oncall were the mostly used pesticides by 
both categories of fanners. Credit farmers used more than 3 litres of oncall in hectare and less than 2 litres 
of ripcord. And non-credit growers used about 3.74 litres per hectare of ripcord and a few used oncall. 
The use o f ripcord and rogor was more prevalent in non-credit rich fanners. It also came out from the 
survey that cotton growers still have confidence in these two pesticides, although they are thought to be 
old and expensive.
The situation was not the same with high performing cotton growers. In both categories o f fanners, cotton 
was a profitable enterprise. These growers realised positive gross margins o f about E 686.22 and E 814.69 
per hectare for credit and non-credit farmers respectively. Credit cotton growers obtained less profit than 
non-credit farmers did. Interest that was paid by credit farmers made their profit to be less than that of 
non-credit fanners. This may be one of the reasons, some cotton growers do not utilise the credit facility 
that is offered by Vunisa. The high spread in interest rates means that the opportunity cost of using on 
farmers is the 11% they could obtain on bank savings.
5. Policy Analysis Matrix.
In the PAM framework, productivity of the different categories of fanners is compared at market prices to 
measure private profitability and at national opportunity costs to measure social profitability.
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5.1 Valuation of output and inputs for the PAM.
The impact of agricultural policies is measured relative to what prices would have been, had there been no 
interventions and a free trade regime exists. According to Monke and Pearson, world prices are the 
backbones of social valuation and efficiency analysis of agricultural systems. Gittinger (1992), states that, 
an efficiency price is an economic value used in economic analysis that reflect the opportunity cost or 
value in use of a good and it may be a market price or shadow price.
5.1.1 Private valuation
Valuation of the first row of the PAM is achieved by using market prices. A market price by definition is 
one at which goods and services actually exchanged for other goods or services or for money. It can be 
referred to as a transaction that occurs at any location not necessarily a village or wholesale market. It is 
the observed prices.
5.1.2 Social valuation
Valuation of the second row o f the matrix is based on transforming the private prices to appropriate social 
prices. Thus social prices are estimates of efficiency prices; they are not market prices. Social prices are 
used when the market price is felt to be a poor estimate of economic value because it does not reflect 
scarcity or opportunity cost. The choice of appropriate shadow prices is crucial for DRC calculations if a 
government is unable to adopt the first best (free trade) policy (Dodge, 1977).
(a) Tradable commodities:
For all tradable commodities, the reference prices are the border prices that would have prevailed under an 
intervention free regime (Krueger et al, 19SS). That is to say, for tradable commodities the appropriate 
price would be the world price. Dodge also pointed out that, if the theory o f the second best policy is 
pursued, world prices are the correct shadow prices for tradable commodities.
(i) Output:
The average cotton production of smallholders ranged from 750 kg to I 780 kg per hectare. The difference 
in yield could be attributed to a number of factors including technology, socio-economic and natural 
factors. The average market price was E 2.43 and E 2.44 per kilogram for credit and non-credit farmers 
respectively based on the survey results reflecting prices from Vunisa. The 1998 world cotton lint price 
was used to derive the social price of seed cotton using Jansen’s 1992 methodology of deriving the farm 
gate price of Zimbabwe seed cotton. The social price for seed cotton was E 2.19/kg using world price and 
E 2.30/kg using RSA price (see sections 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2).
(ii) Cotton seed:
Cotton growers buy seed from the Swaziland Cotton Board depot at the Low veld Experimental Station 
and other Central Co-operative Union depots. Acid delinted seed was used by farmers and it was sold at E 
2.58/kg. SCB subsidies seed at 20%, therefore the economic price of seed in this study was E 3.10/kg.
(Hi) Fertilisers:
There are two types o f fertiliser used in cotton production, 2:3:2 (22) which is a compound fertiliser used 
for basal dressing and LAN (28% N) used for topdressing. At market price, the farm gate price for 2:3:2 
(22) was E1.27/kg and E 1.30/kg for LAN (28% N). In Swaziland, agricultural inputs are exempted from 
any form of taxation. There was no evidence of taxation or subsidisation observed in the selling of 
fertilisers. Therefore, the economic price of fertiliser was assumed to be the same as the market price.
(iv) Pesticides:
They were many different types o f pesticides that were used by cotton growers (Appendix 3). Pesticides 
were subsidised at 20% (Appendix 4) by the Swaziland Cotton Board. Therefore, the economic price of 
pesticides was equivalent to the market price plus 20%. As such, the economic price varied according to 
each pesticide used.
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(b) Domestic resource factors:
For non tradable goods or domestic resources such as land, labour and capital the opportunity cost price is 
used, the underlying principle is in terms of national income forgone by not employing the factor in its 
next best alternative activity in the domestic market (Tsakok, 1990). Input factors such as land, labour, 
transport, draft power and capital constitute the category of domestic resource factors of production.
(i) Labour:
Theoretically, the opportunity cost of labour in the production of a commodity is its contributions at 
margin to production of best alternatives. It is equal to average wage rate on competitive labour markets. 
Labour is an important input in cotton production especially at peak periods (weeding and picking). In this 
study the private price of labour reported by cotton growers in the survey was E200.00 per month or E
8.00 per man-day. This labour cost was assumed to be the social cost of labour, as labour in smallholder 
farms is not influenced by labour unions and represents the opportunity cost of family labour.
(i.a) Issue o f thin labour markets:
Although the opportunity cost of labour in this study was estimated at E 8 per man-day, it is possible that 
it over exaggerates the opportunity cost of family labour. When considering family labour in reality, the E 
8/man-day could be observed during peak periods in cotton production (weeding and picking). It is likely 
that the wage rate o f family labour is close to zero or it lies between zero and E 8/man-day. Therefore, 
break-even wage rate for family labour was also calculated to understand the rationale of low performers 
continuing to produce cotton.
The inclusion of family labour at an opportunity cost of E 8/manday is likely to make some cotton growers 
realise negative profits. Negative profits should not be misconstrued as evidence of irrational behaviour of 
the smallholder farmers but evidence of divergence between household specific opportunity cost of factors 
of production and prices observed in the local thin markets which have been used as best estimates of 
shadow prices.
(ii) Land:
The rental value o f land that is determined in competitive land rental market might fully reflect the 
economic value o f land. However, land markets are often thin or absent, as is usually the case in 
smallholder agriculture sectors o f Southern Africa (Magagula and Faki, 1996). The value of land can be 
determined as the residual o f value of output or best alternative crop. Residual values o f land are not easy 
to estimate.
The absence o f informal land markets makes it very difficult to estimate the economic value o f land. 
Therefore, the only alternative was to determine the social value o f land in relation to alternative uses in 
this case, sugar cane production. However, this tends to include effects of externalities and imperfections 
that might influence the profitability o f cotton. Moreover, in the dry middleveld and the lowveld there is 
no shortage o f arable land. This is demonstrated by the availability of unutilised land in these regions. 
Based on the already mentioned limitations, in this study the social value o f was considered to be zero'. It 
is possible that this could bias the DRCs, and therefore sensitivity runs that taking varying land rents into 
accounts as suggested by Magagula and Faki were carried out. In their study they assumed a land value of 
E 150.00 per hectare for rainfed crops.
(iii) Capital:
For the approximation of economic cost of capital a 30% market interest rate prevailing in 1997/98 fiscal 
year was used based on bank loan rate. The interest rate used for financial or private analysis was 20% that 
is different from the economic analysis of 30% because of the subsidised credit loan given to smallholder 
cotton growers by Vunisa, the only buyer of cotton in Swaziland. 1
1 According to Masters it is possible to construct the PAM ignoring the value of land or giving it a fixed 
value. The value o f land is important only for comparisons between crops where land intensity is an issue.
5.1.3.1 Derivation of producer parity price using world price of cotton lint.
The world price is used as the basis for the social price in order to determine whether Swaziland would 
have a comparative advantage if it did not have preferential access to the protected RSA market. Trading 
relationships are changing and Swaziland has to consider its position to compete on the world market.
The social price of seed cotton was derived using Jansen2 method that was used to determine the farm gate 
price of seed cotton in Zimbabwe. According to Jansen, 35% of seed cotton weight is lint. In a similar 
situation, Gersovitz 3( 1992) in CotedTvoire stated that it is 40.19%. The Jansen method was followed 
since the Zimbabwe cotton production situation is similar to the Swaziland one.
The exchange rate that was employed in the determination of social costs was E 5.2335/USS. This was the 
rate prevailing in March 1998. There was no parallel foreign currency market that would instigate the 
calculation and use of a shadow exchange rate. On account of the existence of a fairly free-market for 
foreign currency, it was assumed that the nominal exchange simulates its shadow level. There was no need 
to do a sensitivity analysis basing on exchange rate because there was no evidence of the existence of a 
black market exchange in the country.
The Liverpool price index for cotton lint was 93.98 cents (US currency) per pound in March 
1998.
World price o f  cotton lint is equal to 93.98 c/lb.
Equivalent to 93.98c x 2.205 = 207.2259 c/kg 
Official exchange rate in March 1998 was US $1 = 5.2335 
Therefore conversion factor was = 1/5.2335
= 0.1911.
Thus cotton lint world price in Liverpool in local currency was
2.072259
0.1911
= E 10.84384615/kg or 108.44 c/kg.
Assume an output o f 1 ton.
Vunisa ginning costs are E 1.12/kg o f cotton lint4 5.
Price (E)
Net realisation 10 843.84
Less ginning costs (E 1.12/kg) 1120.00
Less port handling costs charges (USS300)’ 1 570.05
Less transport costs from Durban 
Port to London m arket6 
Equals lint revenue (E/t)
Less transport to Durban (E/t)
Less handling charges 5%
Border price at Big Bend 
Less local transport (E/t)
Less SCB levy charge (4c/kg)
Price at Big Bend 
Seed cotton producer price
Equivalent to
1 384.00 
6 769.79
118.00 
338.49 
6 313.30 
12.00 
40.00 
6 261.30
35% ofE  6 261.30
2 19.145/t 
2.19/kg
2 Jansen (1992), used the world cotton lint price to derive the farm gate price for Zimbabwe farmers.
3 Gersovitz also used world cotton lint prices to get the price of seed cotton in CotedTvoire.
4 Vunisa stated that their ginning costs were between El 10 and El 15/kg.
5 Port handling charges paid by Shipment Services is USS300.00
6 Used Shipment Services (Zimbabwe) transport cost from Durban to London market; USS 1250/5 tonnes.
5.2.1 Private profits.
(a) A verage performance o f  smallholder cotton growers:
In order to clearly view the comparative results between cotton growers who received credit from Vunisa 
and cotton growers who did not, the results from the PAM have been synthesised to show the key results 
in compressed tables as per Table 5.2.1 *. Cotton production by smallholder farmers in the marginal rainfall 
areas was privately profitable in 1997/98. This farm activity generated revenue of about E 3 533 per 
hectare at costs of E 3269.48 for credit farmers (Table 5.2.1). And non-credit cotton farmers made about E 
3 025 per hectare as revenue at costs of E 2 889.05. As such credit and non-credit cotton growers were 
able to make profits of just more than E 260.00 and E 130.00 per hectare respectively.
Table 5.2.1: Comparative table o f  average performance for smallholder cotton growers in 
1997/98 cropping season (E/ha).
Credit farmers Non-credit farmers
DivergencesPrivate values Social values Divergences Private values Social values
Revenue 3533 22 3184 26 348.96 3025.60 2715.60 310.00
Tradables 1239 92 1387.90 - 147.98 1220.30 1364.00 • 144.06
Factors 2029 56 2126 60 -97.04 1668.75 1668.75 0.00
Profit 263.74 -330.24 593.98 136.55 - 317-51 454.06
Source: Primary data
(b) Low performers (smallholder cotton) :
Cotton production by low performers in 1997/98 was not a profitable activity at all in the marginal rainfall 
areas. Credit cotton growers netted a loss of more than E 190.00 per hectare whilst non-credit growers had 
a loss of about E 380.00 per hectare (Table 5.2.2).
Table 5.2.2: Comparative table of low performers in 1997/98 cropping season (E/ha).
Credit farmers Non-credit farmers
Private values Social values Divergences Private values Social values Divergences
Revenue 223560 201480 220.80 1830.00 1642.50 187.50
Tradables 931.61 1117.93 - 186.32 833.57 1000.28 •166.71
Factors 1501.31 1576 26 - 74.95 1382 29 1382.29 0.00
Profit - I97J2 
Source: Primary data
-679J9 482.07 •385.86 -740.07 354.21
(c) High performers (smallholder cotton):
In 1997/98 cotton production on the representative farms of credit and non-credit cotton growers classified 
as high performers was privately profitable. This activity generated revenues of about E 4 325.00 for credit 
cotton growers at costs of E 3 639.18 per hectare. As such, cotton production resulted into high 
performing credit growers making profits of more than E 686 per hectare (Table 5.2.3). Like wise non-
* Full Policy Analysis Matrices are reported in the appendix.
Therefore, the 219 cents/kg or E 2.19/kg was used in this study as the world price of seed cotton when 
calculating the social revenue in the PAM.
5.1.3.2 Derivation of producer parity price using RSA price of cotton lint.
Price
The average cotton lint selling price in RSA 826.58 c/kg.
Assuming a tonne of cotton lint 826.58 * 1000kg
Equivalent R 826 580.00/t
Official exchange rate R 1.00 = E 1.007
Using Jansen’s method of deriving farm gate seed cotton price, and assuming that the Vunisa ginning 
costs are E 1. 12/kg of cotton lint.
Price (E)
Net realisation per tonne 8 265.80
Less ginning cost 1 120.00
Less transport cost to RSA (Durban) 118.00
Less handling charges 5% 318.81
Equals lint revenue (E/t) 6 708.99
Seed cotton price at Vunisa 35% o f6 708.99
Equals seed cotton price 2348.15
Less local transport 12.00
Less SCB levy charge (4c/kg) 40.00
Seed cotton producer price (E/t) 2 296.15
Equivalent to 2.30/ke
THE DOMESTIC RESOURCE COEFFICIENT RATIO (DRC or DRCR)
(Comparative advantage).
The domestic resource cost (DRC) measures the efficiency of an activity in transforming domestic 
resources into foreign exchange (Dodge, 1977). The domestic resource cost is used measuring the 
comparative advantage of an activity. Masters stated that the DRC is a standard unit-free way to present 
the national profitability. The DRC enables the determination of how competitive a domestically grown 
crop is on the world market. It gives an indication of whether the value added in social prices is less or 
greater than domestic factor costs (Monke and Pearson, 1989). If the value added is less than the factor 
costs, then the DRC will be greater than one implying that the domestically produced crop such as cotton 
is not competitive. It would mean that cotton was produced at social costs that exceeded the cost of 
importing. Thus the country does not have a comparative advantage in producing that crop.
Therefore, the DRC is ratio o f domestic factor costs to value added as measured in opportunity costs, that 
is, the DRC measures domestic factor costs per unit of tradable value added.
DRC = _ G _  or ( I r  N, Xri) / (P,Q, - £ r  R,Q,,);
(E - F )
Where:
Nr : Opportunity cost of unit of domestic factor of production r.
Xri: Quantity of factor r used in activity i.
P ]: Import or export parity price of tradable product i.
Q (: Quantity of tradable product i.
R j: Import or export parity price of tradable input j.
Qjj: Quantity of tradable input j used in activity or crop i.
The denominator in the equation gives the value added by activity i and the numerator gives the economic value or 
cost of domestic resources used to produce Qj.
7 Both countries are members o f the Common Monetary Area, formerly known as the Rand Monetary 
Area.
credit cotton growers made profits of more than E 815 per hectare after incurring costs of about E 3 
186.91. High performers realised better profits than lower performers regardless of access to credit or not. 
This suggested that there are other factors that contribute to profit besides credit.
Table 5.2.3: Comparative table for high performers in 1997/98 cropping season (E/ha).
Credit farmers Non-credit farmers
Private values Social values Divergences Private values Social values Divergences
Revenue 4325.40 3898 20 427.00 4001 60 3591 60 410.00
Tradables 1521 19 1725.43 - 204.24 1371.60 1600.92 - 229.32
Factors 2117.99 2152.43 34.44 181531 1815.31 0.00
Profit 686.22 20.34 665.88 814.69 175.37 529.82
Source: Primary data
5.2.2 Social profits.
Social profits are an efficiency measure of an activity because outputs and inputs are valued in prices that 
reflect scarcity values or social opportunity costs. Social profit is the difference between revenues and 
costs all measured in social prices.
(a) Aggregate average performance o f  smallholder cotton growers'.
On average cotton production by smallholder farmers is not socially profitable for both categories at world 
market prices. By growing cotton, credit farmers realised a loss o f about E 330 per hectare and non-credit 
farmer’s loss was close to E 317 per hectare at national level (Table 5.2.1). The results indicate that if 
Swaziland has to compete on the world market cotton production by smallholder farmers is an activity that 
is economically undesirable. Therefore, the government is providing incentives to smallholder farmers to 
produce a crop that may be socially unprofitable; it was not able to supply the RSA market. Implicit 
transfers of approximately E 350 per hectare to credit cotton growers and E 310 to non-credit growers 
reflects the incentives to farmers.
(b) Low performers'.
Social profitability as depicted in Table 5.2.2, reflects a general loss in cotton production at the national 
level for low performers cotton growers. When considering the situation of private profitability low 
performers would be better off not growing cotton because of the negative profits. As such cotton 
production by low performers is not competitive at all. Therefore, this category of fanners may be better to 
switch from cotton production into other crops which do not require a lot of inputs (labour, pesticides and 
fertilisers) like some o f the legumes (beans, cowpeas) and sweet-potato that were found to be grown 
within the study area.
(c) High performers:
Social profits indicate that these groups of farmers are efficient in growing cotton for the world market 
(Table 5.2.3). At national level credit farmers made profits of more than E 20 per hectare, for non-credit 
farmers it was approximately E 175 per hectare. The results showed that non-credit cotton growers were 
more efficient in cotton production than credit cotton growers. This arose from the use of scare but 
subsidised credit resources with an opportunity cost interest rate of 30%.
5.2.3 Divergences (taxes and subsidies).
Divergences are distortions preventing full opportunity cost price from prevailing in domestic markets for 
commodities, inputs and factors of production. Divergences can also be explained as the difference 
between private and social valuation of revenue, tradable input costs, domestic resource costs and profits.
(a) Output market divergences:
From the results tables (Tables 5.2.1, 5.2.2 and 5.2.3) positive divergences are observed in the output 
market. According to theory, positive divergences indicate transfers to farmers and it provides incentives 
to farmers to grow cotton. The divergence on output had on average made cotton production to be 
privately profitability for smallholder farmers. Thus on average, there is a divergence o f about E 350 per 
hectare with respect to revenue in the case of credit cotton growers (Table 5.2.1). In the case of non-credit 
farmers, there was divergence o f about E 310.00 per hectare. These divergences indicate that there would 
be a transfer o f income to both credit and non-credit smallholder cotton growers, because of the deviation 
of the producer price in private prices from its world market equivalent. This divergence is the result of 
access to the protected RSA market. Such that, smallholder cotton production would be unprofitable if 
Swaziland were to export on the world market. When considering the different sub-groups (low and high) 
of cotton growers, the results also show positive divergences. That is, there was a transfer o f more than E 
220 per hectare to credit farmers and about E 190 to non-credit low performers cotton growers (Table 
5.2.2). Despite the implicit transfer to this group of farmers with respect to revenue cotton production was 
neither privately nor socially profitable.
However, the results show that for high performers, cotton production is privately and socially profitable 
for both credit and non-credit farmers (Table 5.2.3). Although there was an implicit transfer of 
approximately E 430 per hectare to credit farmers and about E 410 to non-credit farmers, the activity 
remained socially viable. Therefore in the case of high performers, the prevailing cotton pricing and 
marketing policies provide incentives to this group of farmers to produce an economically desirable crop 
at national level.
(b) Tradable input market transfers:
The results o f the study indicate that tradable inputs are subsidised for all groups of farmers by the 
existing pricing policies (Tables 5.2.1, 5.2.2 and 5.2.3). On average smallholder cotton growers with credit 
had a subsidy o f close to E 150 per hectare and those without credit were subsidised by more than E 140 
per hectare with respect to tradable inputs (Table 5.2.1). This is an indication of incentives to 
smallholders. As such the income transfer to farmers led into private profitability of the activity. As 
regards to low performers, the divergences of more than E 180 and E 160 for credit and non-credit cotton 
growers respectively are signs of income transfer to this group of growers (Table 5.2.2).
The group of high performers also received subsidies as shown by the divergences of more than E 200 per 
hectare in both categories of farmers with respect to tradable inputs (Table 5.2.3). This group o f high 
performers purchased tradable inputs at a subsidised price, which led to the private and social profitability.
(c) Divergences in domestic factor markets:
Domestic factor markets did not tax smallholder cotton growers. The results indicate a transfer of about E 
100 per hectare to credit growers (Table 5.2.1). The zero divergence observed on non-credit farmers 
occurred because they did not receive any subsidised credit and the cost of land was assume to be zero.
(d) Divergences in overall profitability
Divergences in overall level o f profit provide net measure o f aggregate transfers or net incentives. 
Therefore, it is not enough to assess the level of transfers in output and input markets or markets of each 
of the domestic factors as transfers in one market can be offset by transfers in another market.
In this study, if  market failures are assumed to be unimportant or ignored, then the net transfers observed 
in Tables 5.2.1, 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 measure mainly the effects of inputs and output pricing policy in the cotton 
industry. The results o f the study reveal that, cotton growers would not be competitive on the world
market even though privately it is a profitable activity. Their private profits are increased because of the 
subsidising policy on markets of output, tradable and factor inputs.
5.2.4 Efficiency indicators and Comparative advantage.
The results are calculated on per hectare basis and are of interest within a farming system. According to 
Masters, ratios are absolute free measures of profitability and they are used for comparisons across 
different sectors in a farming system.
The PCR, NPC and EPC are different measures of transfers to or from fanners (Table 5.2.4). Then the 
DRC measures the national profitability and it a typical way o f measuring the comparative advantage. The 
lower the DRC, the less is the domestic cost of earning a unit of foreign exchange, so the more 
comparative advantage is enjoyed by that activity.
Table 5.2.4. Coefficients o f  transfer effects and comparative advantage on the world market.
A VERA GE PERFORMANCE
Credit Non-credit
LOW PERFORMERS 
Credit Non-credit
HIGH PERFORMERS 
Credit Non-credit
PCR C/(A-B) 0.88 0.92 1.15 1.39 076 069
NPC A/E 1.04 1.03 I I I 1.11 1.06 1 08
EPC (A-B)/(E-F) 1.15 1.15 1.45 1.55 1.18 I I I
DRC G/(E-F) 1.18 1.23 1.76 2.15 0.99 0.91
Source: survey data.
5.2.4.1 Coefficients o f  transfer effects.
(i) Private Cost Ratio (PCR).
The results show a PCR of 0.88 and 0.92 for credit and non-credit smallholder cotton growers on average 
(Table 5.2.4). These PCRs indicate that cotton production by smallholder farmers is financially viable. In 
the case of credit cotton growers the PCR indicates that for every E 0.88 of domestic factor costs used, E
1.00 net revenue is generated. And likewise, for every E 0.92 of domestic factor costs incurred by non­
credit growers, E l.00 is generated as net revenue. Thus non-credit smallholder cotton growers use more of 
domestic factors than credit growers do, which tends to lower the margin between private revenue and 
costs.
The results also show PCRs of 1.15 in the case of low performers credit growers and 1.35 for non-credit 
growers in the same group (Table 5.2.4). These results indicate that low performers cotton growers incur 
more costs in terms of domestic factors to generate revenue of E 1.00. Such a situation led to this group of 
cotton growers to realise negative private profits.
On top of that, the results in table 5.2.4 show PCR of 0.76 for credit farmers and 0.69 for non-credit cotton 
growers in the group of high performers. Such results mean that, for every E 1.00 revenue generated by 
high performers credit cotton growers a E0.76 domestic factor costs is incurred. The case being the same 
for non-credit farmers, that is, for every E 0.69 of domestic factor costs used, El. 00 is generated as net 
revenue.
(ii) Nominal protection Coefficient (NPC).
The nominal protection coefficients in Table 3.1.5 are generally above one, suggesting that smallholder 
cotton growers were receiving more on output prices (market prices) than the world prices. On average the 
estimated NPC was 1.04 for credit growers and 1.03 for non-credit cotton growers (Table 5.2.4). This 
implies that the producer prices of cotton for credit and non-credit smallholders were 4% and 3% above 
the world price equivalent of seed cotton respectively. Due to the incentives provided by the high producer 
prices as a result o f access to RSA market, the activity was privately profitable to smallholders.
As for low performers, the NPC was 1.11 for both credit and non-credit growers (Table 5.2.4). These 
results mean that both categories in this group of growers received 11% more on producer prices than the 
actual world prices. This is an indication of incentives.
The NPCs for high performers were 1.06 for cotton growers with credit and 1.08 for those without credit 
(Table 5.2.4). This implies that, the producer prices or market prices were 6% and 8% above the social 
prices for credit and non-credit growers respectively. In respect to these protections, the activity’s private 
profits were higher than the social profits for both credit and non-credit cotton growers in this group of 
high performers.
(iii) Effective protection coefficient (EPC).
The EPCs for all categories o f farmers in Table 5.2.4 are substantially above one and also above the NPCs, 
showing transfers to smallholder cotton growers in the marginal rainfall areas. Moreover, Table 5.2.4 
show that on average the EPCs were 1.15 for both credit and non-credit cotton growers. This means that 
value added in private prices was 15% more than what it would be without distortions. Farmers were 
receiving incentives from both product and input markets.
The EPC for low performers with credit was 1.45 and l .55 for those without credit (Table 5.2.4). This 
indicate that lower performers cotton growers were receiving incentives from product markets such that, in 
the case o f those with credit, the value added in market prices was 45% and 55% for those without credit 
more than what it would be without marketing and pricing policy distortions.
Table 5.2.4 also shows EPCs of 1.18 and 1.11 for high performers credit and non-credit cotton growers 
respectively. Such a situation implies that the value added in private prices was 18% for credit farmers and 
11% for non-credit farmers more than what it would be without distorting policies in the cotton industry. 
Therefore, high performing cotton growers were receiving incentives from the cotton market.
S.2.4.2 Comparative advantage.
The results show average DRCs of 1.18 for credit farmers and 1.23 for non-credit (Table 3.1.5). These 
DRC values are above one, indicating that smallholder cotton production would not be efficient on the 
world market. This situation implies that on average there is no comparative advantage in cotton 
production on the world market. The condition of not having a comparative advantage is also observed in 
the case of low performers. The DRC values are 1.76 and 2 .15 for farmers with credit and without credit 
respectively. The situation is different when considering high performing cotton growers. For this group of 
cotton growers the DRC values were slightly less than one, for credit farmers the DRC was 0.99 and 0.91 
for non-credit farmers. This indicates that, high performers cotton growers have a comparative advantage 
since the values are lower than one. In Swaziland, growth can be maximised by expanding cotton 
production up to a point where the DRC = I in the case of high performers. However, a simulation on 
table 5.2.5 shows that both categories of farmers on average have a comparative advantage for as long as 
they sell to RSA market.
When using RSA cotton price, cotton production is privately and socially profitable for smallholder 
farmers (Table 5.2.5). The DRCs for farmers with and without credit were 0.98 and 0.97 respectively, 
indicating comparative advantage.
Table 5.2.5: Average performance o f smallholder cotton growers Policy Analysis Matrix using
RSA price (E/ha).
Revenues Tradables Factors Profit
Private Values Credit growers 3533.22 1239.92 2029.56 263.74
Non-credit growers 3025.60 1220.30 1668.75 136.55
Social values Credit growers 3523.50 1387.90 2126.60 9.00
Non-credit growers 2989.20 1264.36 1668.75 56.09
Divergences Credit growers 9.72 147.98 97.04 224.74
Non-credit growers 36.40 144.06 0.00 87.66
DRC for credit growers = 0.99
DRC for non-credit growers = 0.97
5.2.5 Sensitivity analysis.
The two main factors that affect the comparative advantage are crop yields and the international 
commodity prices. Well the effect of the exchange rate may also come into consideration especially if 
there are considerable deviations from the real exchange price or existence of black markets. In this study, 
it been assumed that the prevailing exchange rate simulates the real one. Although the price of land was 
assumed to be zero in the previous analysis, under this section the price of land was taken to E 150/ha as 
suggested by Magagula and Faki.
First the average DRCs were recalculated at 10% reduction in world cotton prices and later when the land 
opportunity cost was considered to be E 150/ha. The increase in the production o f cotton substitutes like 
the synthetic fibres, it is likely that the world demand of cotton will decrease leading into reduction in 
cotton world prices.
(a) The world cotton price falls by 10%.
If the world cotton price would fall by 10%, cotton production by smallholders would be privately and 
socially unprofitable. This means that the prevailing pricing and marketing policies would encourage all 
smallholder farmers to grow a crop in which the country has got no comparative advantage. On average 
cotton growers would continue making private profits where else at national level cotton growing would 
be undesirable. Therefore cotton production by smallholders would not be competitive because o f the 
negative social profits that would be realised even in the case of high performers (Table S.2.6).
Table 5.2.6: Comparative table of high performers using 10% fall in world price (E/ha).
Credit farmers Non-credit farmers
Private values Social values Divergences Private values Social
values
Divergences
Revenue 4325.40 3506.60 818.80 4001 60 3230.80 770.80
Tradables 1521.19 1725.43 - 204.24 1371 60 1600.92 - 229.32
Factors 2117.99 2152.43 -34.44 1813.31 1815.31 0.00
Profit 686.22 -371.26 1057.48 814.69 -185.43 1000.12
Source: Primary data
As much as the activity would remain private profitable, they will be no comparative advantage on the 
world market. The DRC values of 1.28 for credit farmers and 1.31 non-credit farmers indicate that, on 
average it will be costly to use domestic factors for cotton production in a situation where the world price 
had fallen by 10%. This would not be a surprise since under the current situation, the country’s 
comparative advantage is only observed in high performers where it is also very low.
This means that under the current yields a 10% fall in world price of cotton could make all smallholder 
farmers to be inefficient in cotton production and Swaziland would not be competitive on the world 
market at all.
(b) Using E 15 0/ha as the social value o f land.
Previously in this study, the social cost of land has been set to equal zero according to Jansen, Masters, 
Sifundza and Dlamini. However, in this section of the study the land value was assumed to be E 150/ha as 
suggested by Magagula and Faki. According to these authors this land cost reflects different average land 
productivity under differing land use conditions and tenure rules. In the lowveld the values are much 
lower than high agro-ecological potential areas (highveld and western middleveld). If the land price is 
taken into account, on average farmers would continue making private profits but not social profits. High 
performers cotton growers would make profits privately and socially, however, their social profits would 
diminish (Table 5.2.7). Interestingly, this group would continue having comparative advantage in cotton 
production on the world market because of the DRC values of 0.97 for credit farmers and 0.94 for non- 
credit farmers.
Table 5.2.7: Policy Analysis Matrix for high performers smallholder conon growers when land price is taken into 
account. (E/ha)
Revenues Tradables Factors Profit
Private Values Credit growers 4325 40 1521.19 2117.99 686.22
Non-credit growers 4001.60 1371.60 1815.31 814.69
Social values Credit growers 4095.30 1725.43 2302.43 67.44
Non-credit growers 3701.10 1600.92 1965.31 134.87
Divergences Credit growers 230.10 - 204.24 - 184.44 618.78
Non-credit growers 300.50 - 229.32 -150.00 679.82
DRC for credit growers * 0.97
DRC for non-credit growers » 0.94
Source: survey data.
5.2.6. Performance of non-credit cotton growers using 11% as the opportunity cost price for capital.
Even though non-credit cotton growers do not pay interest on capital, they forgo an interest o f 11%, which 
their money could have earned if it was deposited in a bank account. Farmers rely mainly on family labour 
for their production operations, therefore the cost of labour was not included in the calculation o f interest 
because farmers do not actually pay family labour but retain profits instead. If the cost o f family labour 
was included in calculating interest that would exaggerate the amount o f capital used. By including the 
opportunity cost of capital non-credit farmers would realise private profits of less than E 20 per hectare 
and at national level the activity would be making negative profits. Basically, this means that, by not 
including the opportunity cost of capital the profitability of the activity was exaggerated. However, the 
high performers still realise profits o f more than E 664 per hectare and a DRC o f 0.99 (Table 5.2.8).
Table 5.2.8: High performers non-credit smallholder cotton growers Policy Analysis Matrix using 11% as the 
opportunity cost price for capital (E/ha).
Revenues Tradables Factors Profit
Private Values Non-credit growers 4001.60 1371.60 1965.29 664.71
Social values Non-credit growers 3591.60 1600.92 1966.71 23.97
Divergences Non-credit growers 410.00 -229.32 -1.43 640.75
Source: Survey data.
DRC for non-credit growers = 0.99
5.2.7. Are low performers smallholders cotton growers irrational by growing cotton?
This is one of the most important questions, which arise from the analysis in this study. To provide 
suggestions or ideas, which could be used to come up with effective policies for this group of farmers, it 
could be better to estimate the breakeven yield and breakeven family labour wage rate. The major reason 
of considering yield and family labour is that low performers cotton growers realised negative private 
profits because o f low yields and they relied on family labour for their production activities.
5.2.7.1 Breakeven yields.
Under the current marketing and pricing cotton policies, where there is transfer of income to cotton 
growers in the output market, low performance cotton growers can breakeven when, credit farmers obtain 
yield of 1001.2 kg/ha and non-credit farmers obtain yield o f 908.14kg/ha. Thus a situation would ensure 
that low performers are not making any losses in terms of private profits neither would they make any 
profits. Credit farmers need to increase their yields by 81 kg/ha and non-credit farmers have to increase 
their yields by 158.14 kg/ha.
Since some of the farmers within this study area were able to realise high yields, that, is an indication that 
even this group of farmers may obtain such yields. May be if they can increase fertiliser application rate, 
pesticides use, increase area under cotton and have access to credit since these variable had significant 
influence on farmer’s yields'.
5.2.7.2. Breakeven labour wage rate.
The study survey results indicate that, a majority (87.3%) of low performers, regardless of the different 
categories, relied on family labour for their cotton production activities. It is possible that the labour cost 
used had over exaggerated the opportunity cost of family labour
If credit and non-credit smallholder low performers cotton farmers could use E5.96 and E4.48 per man- 
day for labour, that could reduce their domestic factor cost in terms of private prices. Such labour costs 
could make low performers not to realise negative profits by growing cotton.
5.3. Discussion of PAM results.
Cotton production was a privately profitable activity for both credit and non-credit farmers in the marginal 
rainfall areas. The profits were strongly positive in market prices leading to credit cotton growers 
obtaining E 263.74 as profit per hectare and E 136.55 in the case of non-credit growers. Non-credit cotton 
grower's profit was about half the profit of credit cotton grower. Such difference in profits could be 
attributed to the significant difference in yield between the two categories of smallholder cotton growers. 
Surprisingly, not all smallholder farmers realised private profits by engaging in cotton production. In the *
* These variables were significant at p 3 0.05 after linear regression analysis was done.
case of low performers in both categories of farmers, cotton production was not privately profitable 
because of the low yields that they obtained.
Smallholder cotton growers enjoyed profits at market prices, this would not be socially profitable if 
Swaziland competed on the world market. This means that the access to the RSA market, the pricing and 
marketing policies put in place by the government are encouraging farmers to grow cotton.
The average performance private cost ratio for smallholder cotton growers were 0.88 and 0.92 for credit 
and non-credit farmers respectively. These PCRs indicate that cotton production by smallholder farmers is 
financially viable. In the case of credit cotton growers the PCR indicates that for every E 0.88 o f domestic 
factor costs used, E 1.00 net revenue is generated. And likewise, for every E 0.92 of domestic factor costs 
incurred by non-credit growers, El.00 is generated as net revenue. Thus non-credit smallholder cotton 
growers use more o f domestic factors than credit growers do, which tends to lower the margin between 
private revenues. This means that cotton production by smallholders in Swaziland can afford to pay 
domestic factors and still remain financially competitive.
The nominal protection coefficients were all above one in both categories o f fanners. This implies that, 
there would be transfers o f income in the product market to smallholder cotton growers at world prices. 
On average the NPC were 1.04 for farmers with credit and 1.03 for those without credit. This tends to 
indicate that smallholder cotton growers were receiving 4% more in market prices than its equivalent 
world price. Growers without credit received 3% more market prices. Such incentives are observed in 
private profits for farmers with the exception of low performers. Such NPC values are magnified by the 
huge divergences in the output markets that led to farmers to obtaining high positive profits in market 
prices but realising negative profits in social prices.
The effective protection coefficients of all categories of farmers were above one indicating that they were 
transfers to smallholder cotton growers in the marginal rainfall areas. The average EPC was 1.15 for both 
credit and non-credit cotton growers. This means that value added in private prices was 15% more than 
what it would be without distortions. Farmers were receiving incentives from product markets. These 
implicit transfers in the product market made smallholder’s cotton production to be privately profitable 
but they would not be at world prices.
Due to the unprofitability o f the activity at national level, the DRC values were above one when using 
world prices. This implies that there is no comparative advantage for smallholders to produce seed cotton 
if Swaziland competes on the world market. Only high performers have a comparative advantage in cotton 
production when the opportunity land price was taken into account and the world price could not fall by 
10%. Access to RSA market makes the country to be competitive in cotton production. The DRCs values 
were 0. 98 for credit farmers and 0.97 for non-credit farmers when using RSA prices.
When comparing these two categories of farmers, labour was the most expensive input. Credit farmers 
used E l 560 and non-credit farmers E 1 411 per hectare for labour. It is important to note that, family 
labour was also included in the calculation of labour cost. This was done in recognition of the contribution 
made by family labour in the production of cotton under smallholder conditions. This observation is in 
agreement with Master’s (1989) conclusion that cotton is the most labour intensive cash crop. Labour is 
required for almost the entire period of the crop whilst still in the field. Cotton growers reported that 
weeding and picking are main operations, which need a lot o f labour to be carried out.
Although some smallholder farmers would not have a comparative advantage in cotton production that, 
does not mean that they have to forget about the production o f cotton because some farmers within the 
same area have a comparative advantage. The low performers were unable to make profits both at private 
and national price because of low yields. So it became imperative to consider those variables that had an 
influence on yield. Such analysis led to the next chapter on the analysis of factors affecting farmer's yield.
6. Yield productivity gap analysis.
Yield is important in farmer’s profits as the discussion of break-even yield shows. However, not all 
farmers in this study obtained high cotton yields to offset the costs of production. On average credit 
farmers had slightly higher cotton yields than non-credit farmers but significant (p = 0.05). Since averages 
are sensitive to extreme values in a range, relying entirely on them may not lead to sound policy 
formulation.
In the previous analysis it was observed that low performing farmers irrespective of the category made 
negative profits privately and socially. Where as high performers made profits at market prices and at 
national level. Yield was identified to be the main contributing factor in farmers’ profits and efficiency in 
cotton production. Low performers credit farmers’ yield was almost half (920kg/ha) the yield of high 
performers (1780 kg/ha). In the case of farmers without credit, high performer’s yield (1640 kg/ha) was 
double the yield of low performers (750 kg/ha).
6.1 Factors affecting cotton yields
The following socio-economic factors had a significant influence on farmer’s cotton yields9 10: area under 
cotton production, education, age, farming experience, expenditure of basal fertiliser, expenditure of 
pesticides, and access to credit. Surprisingly variable such as source of draft power, expenditure on top 
dressing fertiliser and labour did not significantly influence yield at p = 0.05 nor at p = 0.10.
Therefore the difference between low and high performer’s yields can be explained by those variables that 
were significant, as shown by the linear regression model (equation 1).
Yd=/[X I,X 2...X n]
Where: yd is the yield differential.
Xl,X2...Xn are the independent variables
yd = /(education, farming experience, cotton area, expenditure on basal fertiliser and pesticides, and
credit)........................................................................................................................................................ (1)
The variables affecting cotton yield can be written as a yield model:
yc = 2.467 + 0.235 C. + 0.549 Bf + 0.22 Fc + 0.035 Pt + 0.253 E, + 0.108C,................................ (2)'°
R2= 0.763 Adjusted R: = 0.749 F = 54.079**
Where: yc = mean cotton yield
Ca « area under cotton 
Bf -  expenditure on basal fertiliser 
Fc ■ years of cotton production 
Cr "  access to credit 
Pc •  expenditure on pesticides 
E| » education level
The model was adopted because the R? of 76 percent and adjusted of 75 percent were high, which gave a good fit 
of the independent variables. The F-statistics was significant indicating that these statistics of the regression were 
significant at p -  0.05.
In equation 2, the constant means that once cotton is planted, significant output per hectare will be realised 
by smallholder growers. The area under cotton variable indicates that, an increase in area planted to cotton 
will result in a significant increase in cotton yield. The expenditure on basal fertiliser variable means that 
an increase in basal fertiliser application rate would increase the cost of fertiliser but it will lead to
9 These variables were significant at p = 0.05 (Appendix 2) after running a linear regression model.
10 The standard errors of the coefficients are in appendix 2.
significant increase in cotton yields. Like wise the expenditure on pesticides variable indicates that an 
increase in pesticide application rate will result in a significant increase in cotton yield. The education 
variable indicates that an increase in the farmer’s level of education will significantly increase cotton 
yield. The cotton fanning experience variable means that, as fanner’s experience increase in cotton 
growing a significant increase in yield is observed. Access to credit was the least significant variable.
Expenditure on basal fertiliser variable had a high coefficient estimate followed by area under 
cotton production and level of education whereas access to credit had the lowest (equation 2). The basal 
fertiliser factor indicates that smallholder cotton growers should apply fertiliser at planting for cotton 
yields to increase. This tends to make sense in that, the high performers incurred higher costs on basal 
fertiliser than the low performers and their yields were indeed higher. Low performing credit farmers 
applied 103.45 kg whereas the high performing ones applied more than twice (217.86 kg/ha) that amount 
of fertiliser at planting. The story was the same with non-credit farmers, that is, low performers applied 
98.56 kg/ha and the high performers applied 206.41/ha (Appendix 3). Although, the high performers 
applied higher dosages at planting, that rate is below the recommended fertiliser rate for cotton production 
in the region". According to the regression analysis, an increase in basal fertiliser application rate by I kg 
will result in an increase o f cotton yield by 0.55 kg. Therefore, under the existing cotton pricing and 
marketing policies smallholder farmers can increase the output by increasing fertiliser rates at planting. 
Although access to credit variable had the lowest coefficient that does not mean that credit is the least 
important factor in cotton production. By being positive significant it means that credit did influenced 
cotton yield. Equation 2 shows that a unit increases in credit will increase smallholder yield by 0.108 
units. In this study credit farmers had higher yields than non-credit farmers did in all the different 
categories o f cotton growers. Credit is therefore a factor in increasing yields but not the most important 
factor. The high cost o f credit because of the large spread between savings and credit makes it less 
attractive to farmers.
Since land shortages are not common in the lowveld, smallholder farmers can increase their yield by 
putting more land into cotton production. However, farmers are not likely to put most o f their land into 
cotton production because they have to produce food crops such as maize. Although increasing cotton land 
would increase output significantly but it is not be easily feasible for farmers to do that because of labour 
and capital shortages. The way out would be to consider fertiliser application.
Smallholder’s level o f education also significantly affected yield. The results indicate that a unit change in 
the level of education will result in 0.253 unit change in yield. As cotton growers attain higher levels of 
education that increase their yield. From appendix 3, there were few high performers who did not attain 
any formal education compared to low performers. The explanation is that, farmers with higher levels of 
education can read and understand better than uneducated farmers. As such, low performers did not get 
high yields as high performing farmers because there were many low performers who had low levels of 
education.
6.2 Discussion of yield productivity gap analysis results.
The estimated production model shows that smallholder cotton yield is responsive to socio-economic 
factors and agronomic practices such as education, years o f cotton production, credit, pesticides and basal 
fertiliser application rates.
Since the level o f  smallholder education influenced yield as shown in the production model, if it would be 
assumed that education and understanding are related, then it is justified that high performers had higher 
cotton yields than low performers. Table 8.1 shows that, there were many high performers how attained 
formal education than low performers. Therefore, the high performers had a better understanding of the 
importance of good agronomic practices in cotton production.
11 The recommended fertiliser application rate is 350 to 400 kg per ha (Production Advisory Bulletin no. 1)
/^.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.
The main objective of this study was to asses Swaziland's competitiveness and comparative advantage in 
cotton production. To achieve this objective, cotton pricing and marketing policies were analysed as they 
relate to smallholder cotton growers in the marginal rainfall areas. Input and output markets were assessed 
to find out whether they are divergences and if they are divergences, do they provide incentives or 
disincentives to smallholders. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 show the overall summary of the study results.
Table 7.1: Summary o f  the results.
Gross
Margin
Return to 
labour
Using world price Using RSA price
Social Profit DRC Social Profit DRC
Av. credit growers 263.74 7.23 - 147.98 1.18 9.00 0.99
Av. non-credit growers 136.55 7.56 -144.06 1.23 56.09 0.97
High perf. credit growers 686.22 8.41 20.34 0.99 - -
High perf. non-credit grow. 814.69 8.22 175.37 0.91 - -
Low perf. credit growers -197.32 6.76 - 679.39 1.76 - -
Low perf. non-credit growers -385.86 6.81 - 740.07 2.15 - -
10% fall in world price for:
(a) high performers credit growers -371.26 1.21 - -
(b) high performers non-credit growers -185.43 1.11 - -
Including E 150 as land price:
(a) high performers credit growers 67.44 0.97 - -
(b) high performers non-credit growers 134.87 0.94 - -
11% as opportunity cost for high
performers non-credit growers _______ - 236.03 1.15 - -
Table 7.2: Break-even yields and break-even labour wage rate for low performers.
Break-even yield 
(kg/ha)
Break-even labour wage rate 
(E/man-day)
Low performers credit growers 1 001.20 5.96
Low performers non-credit growers 908.14 4.48
One of the main questions in this study was to find out if  cotton was either privately or socially profitable, 
or both. The study results showed that privately cotton production was a profitable enterprise for both 
credit and non-credit growers with high performing fanners realising higher profits. On average cotton 
production was socially not profitable to smallholders except for the high performers. Therefore, the 
results do not support the hypothesis that the country would be efficient in cotton production on the world 
market. Its competitiveness is limited to high performing cotton growers but not low performing ones. On 
top of that, the PAM results as discussed in chapter 7 showed that smallholder cotton growers would have 
made negative social profits in 1997/98 season on the world market. Therefore, smallholder cotton 
growers in the marginal rainfall areas make profits by growing cotton only because of their access to the 
RSA market.
The monopoly power granted to Vunisa does not encourage competition in the cotton market. The a priori 
expectation would be that, the cotton growers would be taxed thus the divergences from the output market 
would not provide incentives. As such, in the study it was also hypothesised that smallholder cotton 
growers are indirectly taxed due to the existing marketing monopoly. This hypothesis is not accepted on 
the grounds that the results revealed that the government, by establishing prices based on the Liverpool 
price index, ensures that the Vunisa monopoly pays farmers prices above export parity to the world 
market. The effect o f  distortions in the output market showed that smallholder cotton growers receive 
more revenue than what they would get under world prices because o f the bridging costs, which would be
involved. On average credit farmers were getting 11% above the world border parity price because of the 
access to the RSA market.
Moreover, smallholder cotton growers were categorised based on whether they used credit or not. In this 
study credit wras assumed to be an important determinant of higher profits. Which led to the third 
hypothesis of this study that, access to formal credit by smallholder cotton growers affects cotton 
productivity in marginal rainfall areas. This hypothesis is also not accepted because credit farmers’ profits 
were not on average much higher than that of non-credit.
It is important to note that low performing cotton growers do realise positive private profits if the 
opportunity cost of labour rate is reduced. If a lower opportunity cost of labour is assumed then even at the 
current yields, low performers are rational when producing cotton. The study has also demonstrated that, if 
low performers credit farmers can produce 1001.20 kg/ha and non-credit farmers produce 908.14 kg/ha 
they can breakeven in private profits. This means that if this group of farmers can just increase their yields 
by 13%, they obtain positive profits. These farmers can increase their cotton yields by increasing the rate 
of basal fertiliser application.
Swaziland appears to have appropriate prices for seed cotton, the problem is the technology used. Farmers 
have been using Albacala 72 for about three decades, new varieties have not been made available to 
farmers such that its productivity is now low. Such a conclusion is in agreement with Krishma’s 
observation concerning a balanced strategy between producer price and improved technology.
A major finding is that government’s intervention in cotton producer prices appears to offset the price 
distortions, which would arise from an uncontrolled monopoly. Farmers in Swaziland receive more than 
they would if they exported to the world market. The cotton pricing and marketing policies that are put in 
place provide an implicit subsidy to the sub-sector despite the non-existence o f comparative advantage. 
Such a policy should normally be implemented in an activity where the level of comparative advantage is 
large.
Farmers’ yields responded to socio-economic and agronomic factors. The government policy o f promoting 
cotton production through access to RSA markets may not be sustainable. Research and extension policy 
that would improve, the present production technologies in the smallholder sector is desirable, since 
farmer's yield would improve. Thus ensuring that the country remains competitive on the regional and 
world market. Moreover, the textile industry imports cotton lint from regional markets instead of 
purchasing domestic lint. This may change if yields are increased, increasing the profitability o f cotton at 
lower prices.
A substantial improvement in the quality o f cotton research and extension is necessary in order for cotton 
growers to obtain adequate levels o f farm income because on-farm research results have revealed that 
more than two tonnes per hectare can be obtained from farmers’ fields. This must be done in line with the 
government’s objective o f increasing rural incomes and encouraging cash crop production not only to 
increase income but also to diversify export earnings. The improvement o f the cotton extension services 
could increase farmers’ yields.
Way forward for smallholder farmers.
Access to the protected RSA market makes Swaziland competitive in cotton production. Such a situation 
may not hold in the near future because of the market reforms that are taking place within the SADC 
region. Once the SADC market is fully liberalised, it is possible that the South African market will be 
open to other regional markets, then Swaziland would not be competitive in cotton production. Moreover, 
RSA has just signed a free trade protocol with EU and EU is a member o f the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) which is advocating for free trade among countries. This would have an effect on the textile 
industry because they would start buying cotton lint from cheaper sources. Furthermore, RSA and 
Zimbabwe are negotiating for free trade. Zimbabwe is one country in Southern Africa which has a 
comparative advantage in cotton production such that the cotton prices are low. ~
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